



DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM): Introduction and Overview

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- ∴ Traditional Content Scanning is reaching its limits
- ∴ Increasing interest in making life better for good players (in addition to penalizing bad players)
 - Messages from good senders can be delivered without spam scanning to reduce load and avoid false positives
 - Messages from known bad senders should be slowed down, carefully scanned, greylisted, challenged, or rejected outright
- ∴ Good senders want an ability to demonstrate their goodness, either by Accreditation (3rd party assurance) or Reputation

- ∴ For most people, 90–99% of their legitimate email comes from people or entities they know
 - Notable exceptions: help desks, inquiry addresses, “info@” addresses, etc.
 - Allow (white) lists can reduce false positives
 - I’ll accept mail from my mother, my boss, or my bank without scanning

- ∴ Also, 90–99% of their spam comes from people or entities they do not know
 - Notable exception: on-line order acknowledgments

- ∴ Critical: must ensure sender is who they claim to be
 - ... not someone pretending to be my bank
 - Phishing usually involves identity theft
 - Authentication required

- ∴ People often confuse the two
- ∴ Authentication: proof that you are who you claim to be
 - Real life example: a passport
- ∴ Authorization: what you are allowed to do, generally based on:
 - Real life example: a visa in a passport
 - Prior knowledge by recipient of who you are
 - Trusted third party accreditation
 - Local- or network-wide reputation
 - “Entry methods” such as Challenge-Response or content scanning

- ⋮ Cryptography-based protocol, signs selected header fields and message body
 - Merge of DomainKeys (Yahoo!) and IIM (Cisco)
 - Merge created by an industry consortium
 - Significant industry support (see dkim.org for a list)

- ⋮ Intended to allow good senders to prove that they did send a particular message, and to prevent forgers from masquerading as good senders (if those senders sign all outgoing mail)

- ⋮ Not an anti-spam technology by itself

- Low-cost (avoid large PKI, new Internet services)
- No trusted third parties required (e.g., key servers)
- No client User Agent upgrades required
- Minimal changes for (naïve) end users
- Validate message itself (not just path)
- Allow sender delegation (e.g., outsourcing)
- Extensible (key service, hash, public key)
- Structure usable for per-user signing

- ⋮⋮⋮ Signature transmitted in DKIM-Signature header field
 - DKIM-Signature is self-signed
 - Signature includes the signing identity (not inherently tied to envelope, `From:`, `Sender:`, or any other header)
- ⋮⋮⋮ Initially, public key stored in DNS (new RR type, fall back to TXT) in `_domainkey` subdomain
 - Extensible to other key delivery mechanisms
- ⋮⋮⋮ Namespace divided using *selectors*, allowing multiple keys for aging, delegation, etc.
 - Example: selectors for departments, date ranges, or third parties
- ⋮⋮⋮ *Sender Signing Policy* lookup for unsigned, improperly signed, or third-party signed mail

∴ Example:

```
DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns;  
d=example.com;  
i=user@eng.example.com;  
s=jun2005.eng; c=relaxed/simple;  
t=1117574938; x=1118006938;  
h=from:to:subject:date;  
b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXS1EniSb  
av+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZVoG4ZHRNiYzR
```

∴ DNS query will be made to:

jun2005.eng._domainkey.example.com

⋮ Currently submitted to Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as Internet-Drafts.

- `draft-ietf-dkim-base-00.txt`
- `draft-allman-dkim-ssp-01.txt`
- `draft-fenton-dkim-threats-02.txt`

⋮ Still some other drafts to be written

⋮ IETF Working Group chartered, first meeting in March

⋮ Several interoperating implementations, some open source

- `http://sourceforge.net/projects/dkim-milter`

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